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ABSTRACT
Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more
extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of
violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable
research on the “capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level,
there has been less attention to its possible individual-level
microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public per-
ceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of
conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of
force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential
economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on
the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of inter-
dependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the
likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the
linkages between individual perceptions about economic inter-
dependence and their views on conflict and peace through a
survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about
approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China
and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indi-
cate that greater knowledge and information about economic
interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and
increases support for peaceful solutions with China.
KEYWORDS
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The idea of a capitalist peace, where interdependence and open economies
have a pacifying effect on interstate conflicts, has returned to prominence after
the Cold War and the growing interest in the democratic or liberal peace
(Friedman 1999; Schneider and Gleditsch 2013). In this article, we shift from
the conventional focus on the aggregate dyadic relationship between trade and
conflict to possible individual microfoundations. We argue that citizens’ per-
ceptions about economic interdependence and the benefits of trade influence
attitudes toward the use of force and thus the potential political constraints for
leaders. We note that most postulated mechanisms relating interdependence
and conflict imply that mass public opinion and perceptions of opportunity
costs can play an important role in shaping the incentives and constraints of
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leaders on the use of force. This in turn means that whether interdependence
constrains leaders from using force depends not just on the actual degree of
interdependence or likely opportunity costs but also on public opinion and
how widely economic interdependence is perceived.
We provide a first analysis of how individual perceptions about interdepen-
dence and the benefits of trade affect attitudes on the use of force. We conduct
a survey experiment in Japan about respondents’ support for the government’s
hypothetical belligerent action against China in an ongoing territorial dispute
where we vary information about economic interdependence. Our results
indicate that Japanese respondents are less likely to approve of belligerent
actions against China when provided with information on more extensive
interdependence and likely costs. Our study complements dyadic studies of
economic interdependence and highlights how public perceptions of interde-
pendence are an important and potentially, in part, independent factor in
understanding how opportunity costs of conflict can constrain the use of force.
Interdependence and Peace Through the Lens of Public Opinion
Many studies examine howmore extensive and more highly valued economic ties
between countries can decrease the risk of militarized interstate conflict (see, for
example,Mansfield and Pollins 2001, 2003; Oneal, Oneal,Maoz, and Russett 1996;
Oneal and Russett 1997; Rosecrance 1986; Rummel 1983, 1985; Russett andOneal
2001). This line of research is of course not without critics; some question whether
interdependence actuallymoderates conflict or question the direction of the causal
arrow,1 while others debate the relative importance of interdependence against
other liberal factors such as democracy.2 Still, most accept the basic finding that
economic interdependence and peace tend to go together, even if the specific
mechanisms producing the relationship remain more contested.
Most research so far focuses on aggregate interdependence at the state level and
its implications for interstate conflict. However, whether the lay public perceives
the importance of trade interdependence and prefers peace is in our view essential
for the underlying logic of many arguments of the capitalist peace. Most argu-
ments highlight objective opportunity costs and assume that greater expected
economic costs of conflict will translate into political disincentives to use force,
since the benefits of trade will be lost in the event of a disruptive conflict (see
Anderton, Anderton, and Carter 1999; Schneider 2014; Simmons 2002, 2005).
1Barbieri (1996) argues that high economic interdependence increases the likelihood of interstate conflicts,
although other scholars have criticized her empirical analysis (Gartzke and Li 2003; Xiang, Xu, and Keteku
2007). Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins (2010) argue that it is primarily conflict that inhibits trade and that the
remaining effect of dyadic economic interdependence on the likelihood of conflict is negligible. Barbieri, Keshk,
and Pollins (2009) emphasize the impact of data and auxiliary assumptions on inferences on the relationship
between international trade and conflict.
2See, for example, the debate between Gartzke (2007) and Dafoe (2011).
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There is little dispute in modern economic theory about the welfare-enhan-
cing effects of trade and voluntary exchange (see Copeland 2015:19). However,
this does not mean that the benefits of exchange are obvious and easy to
understand. Although Adam Smith (1979/1776) emphasized the value of
markets, trade between countries was commonly thought to be beneficial
only under absolute advantage until David Ricardo (1911/1817) developed
the concept of comparative advantage. In brief, Ricardo showed that trade
could increase total welfare, even if one party lacked an absolute advantage for
any commodity, as long as the parties specialized according to their compara-
tive advantage on goods they could produce relatively more efficiently.
Research on interstate conflict has traditionally focused on states as uni-
tary actors (highlighting either individual leaders or collectives acting as a
unit), and a number of theoretical models formalize the constraining effect
on conflict of higher opportunity costs to states under interdependence.3
Theories of constraints through opportunity costs can be extended to indi-
viduals by highlighting how actors with sufficient vested interests in main-
taining trade and avoiding conflict will seek to influence government policy.
Opportunity costs that individuals incur should create particularly strong
incentives for leaders to avoid violent conflict when they are held accountable
through competitive elections, as leaders may lose office if trade disruption
from conflicts affects their support base (Baum and Potter 2008; Russett and
Oneal 2001). However, the same incentives should also apply for many
autocrats with high interdependence, especially if core constituencies stand
to lose economically from military conflict (see Weeks 2008).
The standard accountability model simply assumes that high economic
opportunity costs under interdependence will translate into political incentives
to avoid conflict. There are a number of factors that could undermine this. First,
not all actors stand to gain from trade, and those that do not may favor trade-
disrupting policies. The fact that trade is welfare enhancing in the aggregate does
not mean that the gains are equally distributed or that all people care exclusively
aboutmaterial benefits and welfare relative to other “national interest” concerns.
There is a large literature on special interest groups and trade policies that
suggests possible political challenges to free trade, although most of this line of
research does not focus on the implications for militarized conflict (see Hiscox
2006; Rickard 2012; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).4
3Some approaches highlighting signaling are skeptical of whether observable opportunity costs by them-
selves suffice to decrease the risk of conflict. Morrow (1999) develops a formal model where higher trade
reduces the actors’ resolve for war, but interdependence has an indeterminate effect on the risk of conflict.
Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) argue that greater interdependence allow states to demonstrate resolve
without resorting to military violence. However, these signaling theories do not dispute the existence of
opportunity costs, and it is precisely the opportunity costs that allow states to provide costly signals to
demonstrate their resolve.
4In addition to interest groups, consumers may be opposed to free trade due to other reasons ranging from
consumer tastes and skills (Baker 2005), public health and safety concerns (Kono 2006), to sympathy for
producers (Naoi and Kume 2011), even if they stand to benefit from cheaper imported goods.
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Second, some actors may not be sufficiently sensitive to the implied eco-
nomic costs to be persuaded to oppose conflict. The perceived economic costs
of conflicts also need to be considered relative to the widespread economic
illiteracy detected in many empirical studies. Caplan (2007) shows that the lay
public often has a weak understanding of even basic economic issues and
dramatically different beliefs about the benefits of markets and free trade than
professional economists. Most individuals have at best weakly founded posi-
tions on trade and face difficulties in processing complex information. Lay
respondents also tend to display a consistent bias against foreigners, and even
respondents that claim to be “pro-market” are often skeptical about the alleged
benefits of globalization and trade with “other countries.”
In addition to trade, citizens generally have a weak grasp of international
affairs and facts. Many Americans believe that more than a quarter of the
national budget goes to foreign aid, even though it only accounts for about
1% (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013), and Berinsky (2007) shows that most
individuals have a poor factual understanding of even major events such as
World War II and the second Iraq war. There is also some evidence that
public ignorance goes together with systematic differences in policy prefer-
ences. Dropp, Kertzer, and Zeitzoff (2014) asked American respondents to
locate Ukraine on a map after the 2014 conflict and found that only about
15% of Americans could locate Ukraine correctly. Moreover, the least knowl-
edgeable respondents were also more likely to be in favor of military inter-
vention, possibly as a result of a more limited understanding of the
consequences and likely costs.
Economic literacy and ignorance about foreign affairs is not limited to the
so-called ignorant masses. Krugman (1995:10) notes how many ideas com-
pletely inconsistent with standard economic theory have become “the con-
ventional wisdom among policymakers, decisionmakers, and influential
intellectuals.” In short, actual high interdependence and high potential eco-
nomic costs may not suffice to bring about constraints on the use of force if
people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand
comparative advantage or the benefits of international trade and the likely
economic costs of disruptive conflict.
Rather than assuming that individuals have fixed or static attitudes and
beliefs, we think that it is useful to examine variation in beliefs and information
about interdependence. Public opinion will not promote either capitalism or
peace if a large share of the population is either unaware of or remains uncon-
vinced of the benefits of trade with other countries. We argue that individuals
who perceive (or are told about) greater trade are more likely to become
cognizant of potential costs of conflict and thus reluctant to approve of the use
of force. Conversely, individuals who either remain unaware of the extent of
interdependence, or recognize few benefits from trade, are less likely to consider
opportunity costs a persuasive counterargument against the use of force.
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Beyond variation in actual material interests, differences in public opinion
could also arise from information and issue framing. Caplan (2007) highlights
how economists are more likely to be in favor of markets and free trade, while
Irwin (2009) reports that individuals with more education are more likely to be
positive to free trade. The lay public is also susceptible to whether experts
present an issue in a positive or negative light. Hiscox (2006) finds that
antitrade framing in a survey questionnaire lowers support for free trade,
while endorsement of free trade by economists substantially increases support
for trade liberalization (see also Ehrlich and Maestas 2010). Irwin (2009:26)
shows that respondents in polls are more willing to accept increased interna-
tional trade driven by anonymous forces such as advances in technology but
hesitate to support trade driven by specific policy initiatives such as free trade
agreements. Taken together, the literature on public opinion and trade suggests
that the political role of interdependence is unlikely to be fully contained by
measures of actual interdependence, as many individuals have little information
about the true state of interdependence and costs if disrupted through conflict.
We develop specific expectations on how differences in perceptions of
economic interdependence affect the willingness to support the use of force.
We test these in an experiment with Japanese respondents framed around a
territorial dispute with China, where we can manipulate the information
respondents receive about trade interdependence and trace the impact of
the manipulation on support for belligerent policies. We believe that greater
attention to differences in individual attitudes can help shed light on ambig-
uous findings in existing research and help understand important historical
trends. For example, claims that trade does not enhance peace under differ-
ent degrees of interdependence and more asymmetric interdependence may
reflect more differences in individual beliefs (see Barbieri 2002; Bell and Long
2014; Lu and Thies 2010). Variation in the prevailing views on interdepen-
dence and peace could also help account for the decline of violence (Pinker
2011), as a better understanding of markets and the benefits of trade may
have help lower the willingness to support force. Gat (2009) highlights
resource scarcity as the ultimate cause of war over history. However, whether
resources are considered “scarce” is not just a function of direct control but
also our ability to find substitutes and expand supply through trade. In
particular, we may see a move from traditional mercantilist conceptions of
the national interest, highlighting direct resource control and territorial
conquest, to more liberal conceptions of the national interest, highlighting
trade and lower support for the use of force (see also Holsti 2004).
Propositions
The capitalist peace proposition holds that higher economic costs of
conflict under high trade interdependence should deter conflict between
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states (Russett and Oneal 2001). However, there are at least three out-
standing questions about how this may translate to the individual level.
First, are individuals who are aware of trade interdependence between two
countries also more likely to oppose military action? Second, are there
specific threshold levels of interdependence—both in terms of quantity
and quality—that must be reached to constrain the willingness to endorse
belligerent actions? Finally, does the negative relationship between inter-
dependence and conflicts depend on self-interest or national interest? We
are unable to consider the third question explicitly here5 but focus on the
first two and develop propositions about the conditions under which
individual perceptions about trade lead to their policy preferences on
international disputes and, more specifically, affect the willingness to
support the use of force.
As discussed previously, one key feature of the capitalist peace argument is
economic opportunity costs. We expect that individuals who are aware of a
trade relationship between two countries are less willing to use force to solve
an international dispute due to anticipated economic costs. By this logic,
providing better information about the existence of trade interdependence
with another country should decrease support for the government to take
belligerent actions against that country. This constitutes our baseline
hypothesis:
H1 (Interdependence): Individuals who perceive that there is trade with a
country are more likely to oppose the government’s aggressive action
against the trading partner.
The baseline hypothesis only relies on the existence of mutual trade between
two countries and does not take into account variation in the magnitude or
quality in the sense of what kind of trade countries have. Scholars have
argued in favor of different types of dyadic interdependence that could
have different consequences for the likelihood of violent conflict, including
the degree of symmetry in trade dependence (see Barbieri 1996; Hegre 2004;
Lu and Thies 2010; Oneal and Russett 1999, 2001). Bell and Long (2014)
argue that interdependence has different impacts depending on the issues at
stake. Based on this, we reason that individual respondents may react to
differences in the quality and quantity of interdependence. Our following
hypotheses test more specific conditions under which individuals react to
trade information and formulate their policy preferences.
The first qualification pertains to the degree of interdependence. Lu and
Thies (2010) find that we only observe a positive relationship between trade
5Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find that individual attitudes toward trade are driven more by individual perceptions of
how the national economy is affected by trade rather than by material self-interest.
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interdependence and peace when trade interdependence is very high. This
suggests that providing individuals information of high trade interdepen-
dence should be more effective in activating economic cost-benefit consid-
erations and a fear of possible economic loss derived from an international
dispute. Thus, we expect that:
H2 (High interdependence): Individuals who perceive that trade with a
country is substantial are more likely to oppose the government’s aggres-
sive action against the trading partner than individuals who perceive trade
to be low.
Similarly, it is also possible that what activates individual fears of eco-
nomic opportunity costs is not just the current levels but perceptions about
trends and whether the implication of conflicts for future gains are higher.
Individuals who perceive that economic interdependence is increasing should
thus be more likely to perceive higher opportunity costs and oppose military
action. Thus, we expect that:
H3 (Increasing interdependence): Individuals who perceive that trade with a
country has increased over time are more likely to oppose the government’s
aggressive actions.
The quality, not just quantity, of trade may carry additional weight
with individuals. At the macro-level, Dorussen (2006) argues that differ-
ent commodities have different effects on conflicts (see also Reuveny
2001; Reuveny and Kang 1998). In line with this, we expect that indivi-
duals may perceive dependence on a trading partner to be more impor-
tant if two countries exchange crucial commodities and may be more
likely to oppose aggressive actions as a result. Thus, we propose the
following hypothesis:
H4 (Crucial vs. noncrucial trade): Individuals who perceive that trade with a
country includes crucial commodities to their country are more likely to
oppose the government’s aggressive action than individuals who perceive
trade to include noncrucial commodities.
Finally, we examine whether providing asymmetric (as opposed to sym-
metric) trade information influences support for the government’s belligerent
action. Tests of the dyadic capitalist peace hypothesis often distinguish
between the least and most dependent partner in a dyad and reason that
the least interdependent state will determine the most important constraints
on conflict. However, for individual perceptions about opportunity costs, it
may suffice that respondents know that they are dependent on a trading
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partner and will suffer opportunity costs, even if the other state is relatively
less trade dependent. Thus, we consider the following hypothesis about
asymmetric dependence:6
H5 (Asymmetric dependence): Individuals who perceive that their country is
dependent on trade with another country that is less dependent on the
trade relationship are more likely to oppose the government’s aggressive
action against the trading partner.
Research Design
China and Japan: Economic Interdependence and Territorial Conflict
We believe that a survey experiment in Japan with reference to China
provides an ideal case to test differences in attitudes toward conflict and
individual perceptions about economic interdependence. This allows us to
study the impact of providing information about economic interdependence
on attitude in a setting where we have both high mutual interdependence and
preexisting territorial conflicts that entail a high risk of escalation to crises
and serious military action.
Japan is an advanced capitalist economy, highly dependent on trade with
other countries. The volume of Japan-China trade is substantial; however, the
diplomatic relationship between the two countries is problematic and
strained. The ongoing territorial disputes make the relationship a classical
case of perceived rivalry (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson 1999, 2001).
Japan currently controls eight uninhabited islands within an area of about 7
square kilometers in the East China Sea. These islands—called Senkaku in
Japan, Diaoyu in China, and Tiaoyutai in Taiwan—are also claimed by China
and Taiwan. In 2012, the Japanese government purchased and nationalized
three of the islands from a private owner, which further aggravated the
strained diplomatic relationship between Japan and China.
Focusing on a case with actual conflicts and interdependence provides a
realistic setting for a survey experiment. Previous conflict has had clear and
tangible economic effects. For example, when the Japanese government
announced its intention to nationalize the islands disputed with China in
2012, Chinese consumers responded with a boycott of Japanese products.
Bilateral trade decreased by 3.9% in the following year, which was the first
drop in trade since the global financial crisis in 2008 (Japan Times, January
11, 2013). We surmise that Caplan (2007)’s finding that respondents tend to
be antagonistic to trade with countries perceived as “more foreign” is even
more prominent in a situation of ongoing territorial disputes and where
many people hold nationalistic views, as is the case in the rivalry between
6We also examine the opposite situation in which a trading partner is dependent on the country in terms of trade.
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Japan and China. In addition, since China is not a democracy, our study also
allows us to examine effects of capitalism or interdependence on individual
attitudes toward the use of force against antagonists separately from any
possible effects of respondents preferring to avoid violence against countries
that they see as democratic.
Survey Design
We designed a survey experiment to test our propositions on how informa-
tion about economic interdependence affects the attitudes of respondents to
the use of force and conducted it with a nationally representative sample of
adults in Japan in March 2015. The survey was carried out online, with a
random sample of 1,751 respondents recruited through Internet-based sam-
pling methods, by the survey firm Nikkei Research.
Before we explain our research design for the main survey experiment, we
first show the result of another survey experiment embedded in the main
survey experiment. We conducted this experiment to demonstrate that we
examine a hard case, where many respondents in Japan have strong antipathy
toward China amid the rivalry and strained diplomatic relationship between
the two countries (see Iida, Kohno, and Sakaiya 2012). Specifically, in addi-
tion to including simple perception questions about Chinese politicians and
citizens, to deal with social desirability bias, we adapted a version of Akerlof’s
(1970) lemon market experiment, where respondents are asked whether they
would purchase a PC from a Japanese trading company or Chinese trading
company (Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998). The control group respon-
dents are told:
Suppose that there is a foreign company X’s NEW laptop. A Chinese trading
company A (based in Japan) sells this exactly same NEW laptop 1,000USD,
while a Japanese trading company B sells the same NEW laptop 1,500USD.
Import cost is zero and exchange rate will not affect the transaction.
They are then asked “From which company will you buy the new laptop
computer? No returns allowed.” By contrast, in the treatment group, we intro-
duced uncertainty and switched the words describing the laptop from “NEW” to
“OLD.”7 If the respondents decide based on simple economic cost/benefit
analyses, they should be more likely to purchase a PC from the Chinese
company regardless of the groups. Alternatively, if the respondents make a
decision based on trust, those in the treatment group should be more likely to
purchase an old PC from the Japanese company, due to the added uncertainty
over the reliability of the used PC (that is, a possible lemon), while those in the
control group should be more likely to buy a new PC from the Chinese company
7We controlled for a possible Japanese customer’s attachment to a Japanese product by using “a foreign
company X.”
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without such concerns. However, given the prior high antipathy against China
among Japanese respondents, we expect that most respondents will not conduct
a standard cost/benefit analyses or consider trust in quality of new versus old but
will purchase a PC from the Japanese company under any scenario.
As can be seen from the results in Table 1, the uncertainty treatment does
not change the purchasing behavior of the respondents notably. More spe-
cifically, the table shows that over 70% of the respondents under either
scenario prefer to buy the Japanese laptop, despite the $500 price surcharge
over the Chinese laptop. The difference between the treatment and control
groups is very small and not significant at the 1% level. This suggests that
Japanese respondents have rather nationalistic or mercantilistic views on
commerce with China. Thus, it is likely to be very difficult for information
about economic interdependence between Japan and China to induce
changes in attitudes about conflict due to opportunity costs in this case.8
This supports our claim that this constitutes a “hard” case, where it will be
more difficult to find evidence of information on interdependence changing
individual attitudes.
Next, our main survey experiment tests whether providing information
about trade interdependence to respondents really reduces support for belli-
gerent action by the Japanese government against China, depending on
different trade interdependence scenarios. We exploit the territorial dispute
with China (that is, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands),9 and all respondents
received a hypothetical scenario about a government decision and asked
whether they support or oppose this. More specifically, all respondents
were told that “Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF
(Self-Defense Forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” They were then
asked “Do you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?” on a 5-point
scale: 5 (strongly agree), 4 (somewhat agree), 3 (neither), 2 (somewhat dis-
agree), 1 (strongly disagree).10 As the Japanese government mainly uses
Table 1. Lemon Market Experiment Results.
Chinese Company Japanese Company
New PC 218 (27.7%) 568 (72.3%)
Old PC 189 (26.9%) 514 (73.1%)
Total 407 (27.3%) 1,082 (72.7%)
Note. A total of 262 respondents either did not want to answer the question or responded that they did not
know.
8The antipathy result from the lemon experiment is also consistent with a question we posed to respondents
about their feelings toward Chinese people and politicians, using a feeling thermometer from 0 to 100 (with
higher values more positive). The average rates for Chinese people and politicians were 27.5 and 17.8
respectively.
9Since no Japanese military unit was stationed on the islands at the time of the survey, any military action could be
reasonably considered as a belligerent action and an escalation of the conflict.
10We also asked: “On a binary scale of 0 (oppose) and 1 (support), do you approve of the Japanese government’s
decision?”
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coastal guards and do not have stationed military forces to patrol the islands,
the hypothetical decision should be enough to aggravate the diplomatic and
economic relationships between Japan and China.11
In each scenario, we also randomly inserted a message about trade inter-
dependence, manipulated the degrees and types of interdependence following
the previous hypotheses, while the control group received a scenario that did
not mention trade between Japan and China. Comparing the respondents’
answers among groups with different levels of trade interdependence should
allow us to estimate the effects of perceived economic interdependence on
disapproval of belligerent acts in a conflict setting.
Table 2 shows the list of the treatment groups. First, we have the baseline
treatment to test H1 (that is, economic interdependence vs. no economic
information, T1). Second, we differentiate the quantity of trade relationships
to test H2 (that is, high interdependence, T2a, and low interdependence,
T2b). Third, within the symmetric interdependence framework, we manip-
ulate the trend in interdependence and commodity types to test H3 (that is,
increasing trend, T3a, and constant trend, T3b) and H4 (that is, crucial
commodity trade, T4a, and noncrucial commodity trade, T4b).12 Finally,
we switch between symmetric and asymmetric trade information (that is,
Japanese trade dependence on China, T5a, and Chinese trade dependence on
Japan, T5b).13
Table 2. Summary of Treatment Groups.
Group Interdependence Trend Types
C NA NA NA
T1 Interdependence Information NA NA
T2a High Interdependence NA NA
T2b Low Interdependence NA NA
T3a High Interdependence Increase NA
T3b High Interdependence Constant NA
T4a High Interdependence NA Crucial commodity trade
T4b High Interdependence NA Crucial commodity trade
T4b High Interdependence NA Non-crucial commodity trade
T5a Host’s Dependence NA NA
T5b Partner’s Dependence NA NA
11Note that we intentionally tried to choose a relatively mild action by the Japanese government, as some
respondents may worry that too strong action may result in an excessive Chinese counter-reaction (for example,
they may see as the worst case scenario a loss of the disputed island after Chinese invasion).
12The relative importance of specific commodities depends on the availability of substitutes (Ripsman and
Blanchard 1996), and intra-industry versus inter-industry can pose different vulnerabilities (Peterson and Thies
2012). Since respondents in this survey may be ignorant of the relative importance of commodities, we
deliberately emphasize to the T4a group that one commodity is crucial to produce another commodity. For
group T4b, we do not link two commodities from both countries and choose commodities likely to be seen as
labor intensive and cheap, suggesting less important trade ties. The crucial commodities example uses
semiconductors from Japan, which are key for the Chinese automobile industry, and aluminum from China
key for the Japanese precision industry. For non-crucial commodities, we use paper bags from China and
cardboard from Japan.
13See Appendix B for full translated scripts and Appendix C for a figure of the treatment group summary.
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Other Covariates
Since the research design is experimental, the treatment variables should be
fully exogenous. However, we are also interested in whether some respondents
are more likely to be sensitive to the treatment and change their perception. To
consider this, we also collected other covariates, including gender, age, educa-
tion level, income level, understanding of comparative advantage, and the level
of trust toward the Chinese. We also collected information about occupation,
since we should expect from the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem that high-skilled
workers benefitting from trade interdependence will be more likely to oppose
belligerent government actions (see Schneider 2014). We also collected atti-
tudes about protectionism and free trade. Commenting on the famous Corn
Laws, Ricardo (1815:8) noted that “in the case of war, a combination of the
continental powers may derive us of their accustomed supply.” Thus, those
who believe in protectionism may be more likely to approve the belligerent
government action despite interdependence. Still, relying on the experimental
design, the following analysis does not include the covariates and conducts a
simple t-test to examine a statistical difference between two groups.14
Findings
Table 3 reports a breakdown of approval rates across all the treatment groups
by each answer and shows that a majority of respondents (59.4%) supported
the government’s aggressive act, that is, the decision to station SDF’s destroy-
ers on the Senkaku islands, and only 8.5% of the respondents clearly opposed
the decision. This is consistent with the high levels of antipathy toward China
demonstrated in the lemon market experiment. More specifically, for the
control group in which respondents did not receive any trade information,
the mean approval score is 3.84, close to the category “somewhat agree.” This
suggests that without trade information, respondents are, on average, more
likely to support the government’s belligerent action.
However, despite the baseline antipathy toward China, Japanese respon-
dents reacted to the trade interdependence treatment, and the treatment
group decreases the score by 0.16. Using a regression analysis with a
t-test, Figure 1 indicates that respondents who received information
Table 3. Approval Rate of the Government Action to Send SDF Naval Escorts.
Strongly Agree Somewhat Agree Neither Somewhat Disagree Strongly Disagree NA
Frequency 332 708 478 117 32 84
Percentage 19.0% 40.4% 27.3% 6.7% 1.8% 4.8%
14We show in Appendix A that randomization has succeeded in generating balance across control and treatment
groups on relevant demographic indicators such as age, gender, education, income, as well as knowledge level
about trade.
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about economic interdependence with China were significantly more
reluctant to endorse the government’s belligerent action. This suggests
that knowledge about the economic interdependence between Japan and
China has a pacifying impact, which is consistent with H1 and in line
with a capitalist peace playing out on the individual level.15
We then examine whether the quantity and quality of interdependence makes
a difference. We conduct a regression analysis with a separate treatment group to
demonstrate the results of t-tests. Figure 2 reports the results for H2, H3, H4, and
H5. As the figure suggests, we do not find statistically significant differences for
either the levels of interdependence (H2), interdependence trend (H3), commod-
ity types (H4), or dependence information (H5) on support for the government’s
decision. More specifically, Panel (a) reports that the treatment groups who
receive information about high and low volumes of trade interdependence are
not statistically different (μT2a = 3.68, SET2a = 0.92; μT2b = 3.66, SET2b = 1.00).
Panel (b) shows that whether increasing or constant trends in bilateral trade has a
similar effect on people’s support for the government’s decision (μT3a = 3.73,
SET3a = 0.88; μT3b = 3.72, SET3b= 0.95). Panel (c) presents that two the groups
who receive information about crucial or noncrucial trade interdependence are
not statistically different (μT4a = 3.65, SET4a = 0.94; μT4b = 3.70, SET4b= 0.89).
Finally, panel (d) shows that whether a host country depends on a trading
partner or vice versa does not make a difference in people’s support for the
government’s decision (μT5a = 3.75, SET5a= 0.98; μT5b = 3.76, SET5b= 0.88).
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Figure 1. Treatment effect of economic interdependence information.
15The result is similar even when we switch from economic interdependence to neutral economic information—
relative to the no information group, those who received any kind of information about trade reduce their
support to the government action to station SDF naval escorts (destroyers) on the Senkaku islands.
16We do not find significant results even when we use the control group as a reference category to estimate the
impacts of the asymmetric trade information.
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These non-findings on more complex variation in interdependence are con-
sistent with the idea that the lay public has limited knowledge of more complex
facts and thus tends to use heuristics and information shortcuts (Berinsky 2007;
Irwin 2009). The initial finding combined with the initial non-findings jointly
suggests that individual perceived opportunity costs of conflict largely stem from
interdependence itself and do not vary clearly by the more detailed conditions
outlined in existing research. Somemay wonder whether the significant result of
the first treatment could be due to a positive framing effect, derived from adding
one more sentence to the control group. However, the fact that the other
treatments with similar wordings fail to show significant results suggests that
the effect comes from something else other than a positive framing effect. Still,
we stress that our findings may be partly due to idiosyncrasies of the existing
territorial conflict, and such variation could be more relevant in other settings.
Although the observed effect estimates for the more detailed interdepen-
dence treatments are very small relative to the effect of the simple inter-
dependence treatment,17 skeptics may wonder whether the non-findings
could be driven by low power to the reject the null, especially because the
sample sizes are relatively small. The sample sizes of the current analyses in
Figure 2 are (a) 323, (b) 345, (c) 468, and (d) 351 respectively, whereas the
analysis in Figure 1 is based on a sample of 1,316. To investigate this, we
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Figure 2. Treatment effects of more detailed interdependence information.
17More specifically, we would need sample sizes above (a) 57,078, (b) 207,352, (c) 8,290, and (d) 214,512 for the
observed differences to be statistical significance at the 10% level.
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conducted more formal power analysis to see if the additional analyses had
sufficient power to detect an effect of a similar magnitude to that displayed in
Figure 1, given the sample size used and the observed standard deviations.18
This translates into a standardized effect size/Cohen’s d of 0.2, which also
corresponds to his suggested lower value for social science or psychological
research where the stochastic element may be large (Cohen 1988). Although
the power to reject the null at the 0.1 level is much higher for the larger
sample considered in Figure 1 (power > 0.99), our calculations show that
power in the subsequent analyses with the more specialized conditions is
consistently above 0.8, which is usually considered adequate. The only
exception to this is the sample considered for Panel (a) in Figure 2, where
power is 0.798 and thus formally below 0.8 if not rounded to two digits, yet
this is still very close to 0.8. Thus, even if the sample sizes are relatively small,
it seems unlikely that lower power due to the sample alone can be said to
leave us at high risk of a type II error, or that our conclusions drawn from
these analysis overlook potentially large substantive effects of the more
complex variations in interdependence.
Of course, it may well be the case that the measures used in these experi-
ments are not ideal for detecting these differences, and it would be worthwhile
to consider alternatives in future research that may improve on possible
weaknesses in our approach that we have failed to appreciate. Another possible
explanation for the non-findings is heterogeneity across the groups in the
sample, which, if present, could dampen the average treatment effect. It is
also possible that unobserved characteristics are not balanced across groups in
a way that would also affect the results. Finally, we have the usual problems of
external validity and generalizations, especially with regards to whether the
findings are representative for other populations or rivalry situations. Future
replications with other populations or other geographic settings may lead to
identifying such sources and their potential effects.
Discussion and Conclusion
Despite extensive research on interdependence and peace as well as public
opinion about economic policy, little research so far has examined how
individual perceptions or information about economic interdependence
affect attitudes toward conflict and approval for the use of force. We have
examined whether an appreciation of higher economic interdependence with
a particular state, and hence greater opportunity costs of conflict, makes
people more hesitant to endorse belligerent acts against that state. Using a
survey experiment in Japan on a hypothetical conflict scenario with China
18The observed standard deviations in our subsample range between 0.85 and ≈1, and our substantive conclusion
from these analyses do not change if we use the overall sd for the data or the maximum.
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and drawing on an ongoing territorial dispute, we find that individuals, when
provided information about economic interdependence, become less likely to
support belligerent acts. This is especially noticeable, since we examine
attitudes in a realistic climate of widespread antipathy and deteriorating
diplomatic relationship between the two states.
Our findings have strong implications for the prospects of a capitalist peace as
well as some of its possible limitations. As long ago as 1795, Kant (2010/1795:27)
argued that “[t]he commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner or
later it takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces which lies at the
command of a state, the power of money is probably the most reliable.”
Although we find that highlighting economic interdependence can decrease
support for belligerent action, it is clear from the overall attitudes toward
China in our sample of Japanese respondents that support belligerent action
actually can be very high, even in a situation of high interdependence. Hence, the
commercial spirit still has some way to go in this case, and we suspect that this
will be the case in many other rivalries, even if interdependence is high. Many
have argued that globalization and free trade may not be secure if a largely
ignorant public is persuaded by protectionists interests (Irwin 2009). High
interdependence by itself may not suffice to bring about peace if the public
remains ignorant about independence or its benefits or provides greater repre-
sentation to protectionist interests. Individual differences in opinions about
interdependence are an important variable that needs to be systematically
studied in different settings to understand the likely influence on government
decisions and foreign policy. Finally, our experiment here disregards the role of
institutions or how responsive decision making is to public opinion in the first
place. In particular, a low responsiveness to public opinion in foreign affairs in
democracies or in autocratic states in general can obviously reduce the possible
pacifying effects of public perceptions of interdependence.
However, there is also room for optimism. Our study shows that framing and
informing people about the benefits of trade and likely costs of conflict can help
decrease public support for the use of force, even in a climate dominated by
strong hostilities. A more widespread commercial spirit can potentially decrease
both contentious issues as well as increase incentives to find peaceful solutions,
and promoting economic literacy can in this sense be an important avenue to a
more peaceful world. The political incentives for conflict depend in particular on
the attitudes of influential individuals, and there is some evidence that these
appear to have undergone an important sea change in the present era of
globalization, in ways that are likely to have important limiting effects on the
use of force, even if much of the general public retain a willingness to support the
use of force. Mueller (1999:101) argues that economics has reached a consensus
on some basic essential ideas, thus leading to Truman’s proverbial call for a
“one-handed economist,” and gained increasing recognition as a source of
authoritative advice, with the result that “the random government officials . . .
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consulting the random economist is likely to benefit from the encounter.” In this
sense, support for free trade seems better established among politicians and
opinion leaders, and their influence can help make free trade much less vulner-
able than suggested by some skeptics. Autocracies are also not immune to these
influences. In this sense, our study can be seen as suggesting that economic
factors and a greater appreciation of the benefits of trade can help transform
rivalries and territorial conflict and that rivalry terminationmay be possible even
in the absence of major political change in autocracies if we see a major
transformation of attitudes and public opinion (see Diehl and Goertz 2000:214).
Although our study benefits from the strengths of a randomized experiment,
we need to acknowledge that any single experiment will have limitations. There
may be particular issues with the implementation of our study that have influ-
enced our findings, and it would be helpful to have replications of the study in
other settings. Moreover, the current study cannot speak to whether the differ-
ences that we find here are similar to what we would find among Chinese
respondents or “elite” respondents. In our view, the theory of commercial peace
suggests that economic literacy and an understanding of trade dependence and
opportunity costs of conflict can also be better developed among elites. Here, we
stress again that we believe that the test among Japanese respondents constitutes a
hard test for identifying the effect of economic interdependence information
leading to less support for belligerent actions. Thus, the fact that we find evidence
among less-sophisticated respondents is even more suggestive—if anything, we
would expect to see a stronger pacifying effect by interdependence stimulus
among elites. However, this is only a supposition at this point, worthy of further
investigation, and we hope our study can inspire research along these lines.
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Appendix A
Appendix B
Scripts
Control group (C)
“Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense Forces)’s destroyers
on the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?”
Interdependence group (T1)
“For Japan, China is a trading partner, and for China, Japan is a trading partner as well.
Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense Forces)’s destroyers on
the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?”
High interdependence group (T2a)
“For Japan, China is the top trading partner, and for China, Japan is the top trading partner
as well. Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense Forces)’s
destroyers on the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?”
Low interdependence group (T2b)
“For Japan, China is the ninth largest trading partner, and for China, Japan is the ninth
largest trading partner as well. Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-
Defense Forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese
government’s decision?”
High interdependence, increasing trend group (T3a)
“For Japan, China is the top trading partner, and for China, Japan is the top trading partner
as well. In addition, the trade between Japan and China has dramatically increased since 2008.
Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense Forces)’s destroyers on
the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?”
High interdependence, constant trend group (T3b)
“For Japan, China is the top trading partner, and for China, Japan is the top trading partner
as well. However, the trade between Japan and China has remained stagnant since 2008.
Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense Forces)’s destroyers on
the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?”
Table A1. Balancing Test.
C T1 T2a T2b T3a T3b T4a T4b T5a T5b
Sample size 180 1136 172 151 172 173 313 155 164 187
Age 45.05 45.45 44.84 46.12 44.79 45.49 45.30 46.42 45.99 44.95
Male 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.55
University 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.49 0.57 0.60 0.56 0.58
Income 2.98 2.99 3.06 3.03 2.97 3.10 2.98 2.79 2.96 2.93
Comparative advantage 2.71 2.73 2.70 2.65 2.79 2.70 2.76 2.72 2.80 2.64
Interdependence perception 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.64 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.56 0.59
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High interdependence, crucial commodity group (T4a)
“For Japan, China is the top exporter of aluminum that is key for Japanese precision industry,
while for China, Japan is the top exporter of semiconductor that is key for Chinese auto-
mobile industry. Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense
Forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese government’s
decision?”
High interdependence, non-crucial commodity group (T4b)
“For Japan, China is the top exporter of paper bags, and for China, Japan is the top exporter
of cardboard. Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense Forces)’s
destroyers on the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?”
Host’s dependence group (T5a)
“For Japan, China is the ninth largest trading partner, while for China, Japan is the top
trading partner. Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense
Forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese government’s
decision?”
Partner’s dependence group (T5b)
“For Japan, China is the top trading partner, while for China, Japan is the ninth largest
trading partner. Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense
Forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands. Do you approve of the Japanese government’s
decision?”
Appendix C
Illustrated Summary of Treatment Groups
Economic Treatments or Not
Control Economic Treatments
Dependence
(T5a vs. T5b)
Interdependence (T1)
(T2a vs. T2b)
Trends
(T3a vs. T3b)
Commodity type
(T4a vs. T4b)
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